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lent concealment, or even negligent con-
cealment not related to failure to inspect. 
The court then held that "[i]fthe use of an 
'as is' clause will not protect against 
claims based on common law misrepre-
sentation, a fortiori it will not insulate the 
seller from claims based on the disclosure 
requirements of section 1102 et seq." 
The Fourth District therefore con-
cluded that it is possible for Loughrin to 
prevail in his contention that the purchase 
contract was not intended to insulate Barr 
from liability for misrepresentation in the 
preparation of the statutory disclosure 
form; accordingly, the court held that the 
question could not be decided as a matter 
of law, and it was error for the trial court 
to issue its order denying recovery under 
the first cause of action. 
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The Department of Savings and Loan (DSL) is headed by a commissioner 
who has "general supervision over all as-
sociations, savings and loan holding com-
panies, service corporations, and other 
persons" (Financial Code section 8050). 
The Savings and Loan Association Law is 
in sections 5000 through I 0050 of the 
California Financial Code. Departmental 
regula1ions are in Chapter 2, Title IO of the 
California Code of Regulations (CCR). 
The Department regulates 15 state-char-
tered S&L institutions. 
■ MAJOR PROJECTS 
DSL Undergoes Quiet Transforma-
tion, Reduction. With hardly a word to 
the press or public, and in the absence of 
any legislative alteration of the Savings 
and Loan Association Law and its delega-
tion of regulatory authority to DSL, the 
Wilson administration apparently closed 
down the Department of Savings and 
Loan on March 31 and created a three-per-
son Office of Savings and Loan Adminis-
tration (OSLA) comprised of an adminis-
trator, a financial analyst, and a secretary. 
According to the March 22 issue of Na-
tional Mortgage News, DSL's thrift exam-
ination staff had already been completely 
eliminated in January, and California was 
no longer examining any of the 15 remain-
ing state-chartered thrifts. In June, Gover-
nor Wilson appointed Rosendo Castillo to 
serve as OSLA's administrator; Castillo 
previously served as a mortgage loan con-
sultant for Great Western Bank. 
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Although reformation of DSL into an 
office has been widely expected as the 
number of state-chartered S&Ls has de-
clined and since the Governor vetoed SB 
506 (McCorquodale) in September 1992 
(which would have merged DSL into the 
State Banking Department [ l 2:4 CRLR 
157 ]), the Wilson administration has nei-
ther introduced legislation to amend the 
Savings and Loan Association Law which 
creates DSL nor suggested a reorganiza-
tion plan to accomplish the transforma-
tion. However, the state's 1993-94 budget 
allocates $449,000 to the "Office of Sav-
ings and Loan"-an entity which techni-
cally does not exist in state law, and which 
may not legally be created through the 
budget bill. The $449,000 allocation rep-
resents a severe cutback from DSL's 
I 992-93 allocation of $3.7 million. Also 
in the 1993-94 budget bill, the Governor 
and legislature transferred over $1.9 mil-
lion from the Department's special fund 
(funded by assessments against state-
chartered institutions) to the state's gen-
eral fund to help balance the budget. 
In the absence of legislation creating 
OSLA, DSL apparently reopened as the 
"Department of Savings and Loan" on 
July I. Castillo was replaced with Keith 
Paul Bishop, named by the Governor as 
Interim Commissioner of the Department. 
According to Bishop, DSL's reduced bud-
get, which he says "reflects the reduced 
number of state-chartered associations, 
the increased federal oversight of associa-
tions and an effort to streamline govern-
ment and reduce costs," has resulted in a 
much-reduced DSL staff and regulatory 
program. In addition to Bishop, DSL em-
ploys one full-time examiner, one full-
time executive assistant, and a part-time 
executive assistant. Further, according to 
Bishop, "[t]he Department no longer con-
ducts examinations of state-chartered in-
stitutions. Federal thrift regulators exam-
ine these institutions. The Department's 
examiner reviews the federal examination 
reports. In addition, state-chartered asso-
ciations must seek the Department's ap-
proval prior to taking a number of actions 
[e.g., under Financial Code section 5654], 
and the Department continues to review 
and act on these applications." 
National Commission Recommends 
Abolition of S&Ls. On July 27, the bipar-
tisan National Commission on Financial 
Institution Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement, created by Congress to inves-
tigate the causes of the S&L crisis and to 
suggest actions to prevent its recurrence, 
released its findings and recommenda-
tions in a report entitled Origins and 
Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint 
for Reform. Among other things, the 
Commission's report concludes that the 
best way to avoid a repeat of the S&L 
bailout is to abolish the S&L industry, 
reduce federal deposit insurance coverage 
("the 'necessary condition' for the deba-
cle," according to the Commission), and 
consolidate financial institution regula-
tion. The study cites ineffective govern-
ment regulation as the main reason for the 
scandal; according the Commission, fraud 
or corruption accounted for only I 0-15% 
of the S&L crisis. 
The Commission was created by the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1990; its members were appointed by the 
President, the Speaker of the House, and 
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. 
The Commission included co-chairs An-
drew Brimmer, a former member of the 
Federal Reserve Board who heads an eco-
nomic and financial consulting firm, and 
John Snow, Chair of CSX Corporation, an 
international transportation company. 
Other members included Elliott Levitas, a 
former Democratic congress member from 
Georgia; Robert Litan, director of the 
Center for Law, Economics and Politics of 
the Brookings Institution; and Joseph 
Califano, Jr., former Democratic Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare. 
The report notes that when federally 
chartered S&Ls were hit by the interest 
rate crisis of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, federal regulators relaxed account-
ing rules to avoid closing institutions, all 
but eliminating net worth requirements. 
According to the report, states had to com-
pete with the lax federal regulations by 
becoming equally permissive; to keep 
their S&Ls from switching to federal char-
ters, states such as California, Florida and 
Texas gave their S&Ls unlimited author-
ity to invest in just about any activity, far 
in excess of what federally chartered 
S&Ls might do. [10:4 CRLR J] Further, 
instead of monitoring S&Ls more closely 
in this critical time, state and federal reg-
ulators did the opposite, according to the 
Commission. The Commission notes that 
"[r]egulators, the [Reagan] Administra-
tion, and Congress must share blame with 
the industry for the S&L debacle .... By al-
lowing accounting schemes that made in-
solvent S&Ls look healthy, by virtually 
abolishing net worth requirements, and by 
not raising red flags, regulators permitted 
the powerful S&L lobby to convince the 
public and many in Congress that the sit-
uation was under control." 
The report also concludes that other 
factors, including the following, contrib-
uted to the S&L crisis: 
-The 1981 Tax Act provided a substan-
tial tax preference for real estate invest-
ments and helped create an unsustainable 
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speculative boom, in which many S&Ls 
took part. 
-Federal and state S&L regulators 
were untrained to move against the abuses 
that eventually surfaced in the industry. 
-Regulators allowed accounting prac-
tices that not only masked the extent of 
mounting problems, but also encouraged 
abuse and fraud. 
-Regional factors such as the collapse 
of property values in the Sunbelt, particu-
larly Texas, added to the losses. 
-The Commission report also com-
plains that the news media was "largely 
silent" during the period when the damage 
was being done. 
According to the Commission, the 
S&L industry has no future; in fact, the 
Commission recommends that S&Ls 
cease to be separately chartered and regu-
lated entities, and that S&Ls be converted 
into commercial banks. As a result, the 
agencies regulating depository institu-
tions could be consolidated, and the FDIC 
could be made the sole federal insurer of 
depository institutions, and the sole fed-
eral charterer and regulator of insured de-
positories. Under the Commission's rec-
ommendations, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision would be eliminated. 
Further, the Commission recommends 
that federal deposit insurance be strictly 
limited to accounts offered by entities called 
monetary service companies (MSCs); only 
MSCs would be able to offer government-
insured accounts accessible for third-party 
transactions using checks, electronic trans-
fers, or cash withdrawals. The MSCs 
would be separately capitalized, federally 
insured institutions authorized to invest 
only in short-term debt instruments for 
which there is an active national market 
(such as low-risk money market funds). 
The MSCs would hold reserves at the Fed-
eral Reserve and have access to its dis-
count window. Because these new institu-
tions would hold only highly liquid mar-
ket securities, the FDIC would mark their 
condition to market daily, and calculate 
risk exposures. The MSCs would be affil-
iated with other financial entities, includ-
ing but not restricted to banks and savings 
institutions, and they could share person-
nel and facilities. 
Because the Commission places much of 
the blame for the S&L crisis on Congress 
and federal regulators, and because im-
plementation of its recommendations would 
entail actions by those entities and substan-
tial changes in the existing financial institu-
tion industry, no legislation is expected to 
emerge in the foreseeable future. 
Congress Debates Extending Statute 
of Limitations for S&L Actions. The 
1989 law that created the federal Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation (RTC) also estab-
lished a three-year statute oflimitations on 
bringing actions against former S&L offi-
cials for financial fraud and negligence. At 
this writing, Congress is-for the fourth 
time since I 991-considering whether it 
should extend the statute of limitations 
from three to five years. Previous attempts 
to extend the provision have met with 
significant-and successful-opposition 
from the S&Ls themselves, their accoun-
tants, and their insurers. The current Sen-
ate proposal under consideration would 
apply to any tort action; the House pro-
posal would apply only to claims arising 
from fraud or intentional misconduct. 
■ LEGISLATION 
SB 202 (Deddeh). Existing law pro-
vides that no savings association or sub-
sidiary thereof, without the prior written 
consent of the Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner, shall enter into certain specified 
transactions. As introduced February 4, 
this bill would instead provide that no 
savings association or subsidiary thereof, 
without the prior written consent of the 
Commissioner, and except as otherwise 
permitted by law, shall enter into those 
specified transactions. [S. BC&ITJ 
SB 161 (Deddeh). Existing law requires 
financial institutions to furnish depositors, if 
not physically present at the time of the 
initial deposit into an account, with a state-
ment concerning charges and interest not 
later than IO days after the date of the initial 
deposit. As introduced February I, this bill 
would instead require the statement to be 
furnished not later than seven business days 
after the date of the initial deposit. With 
respect to an increase in the rate of account 
charges or a variance in the interest rate, the 
bill would reduce the notice time from fif-
teen days prior to date of change or variance 
to seven business days. 
The bill would also make technical, 
clarifying changes in provisions specify-
ing the maximum percentage of assets that 
an association chartered by this state 
under the Savings Association Law, in-
cluding a savings bank, may invest in 
specified loans made for agricultural, 
business, commercial, or corporate pur-
poses. [S. BC&IT] 
AB 320 (Burton). Existing law does 
not prescribe interest rates for bank credit 
card accounts, but prohibits defined usu-
rious interest rates for any loan or forbear-
ance made by a nonexempt lender. As 
introduced February 4, this bill would pre-
scribe a maximum interest rate or finance 
charge which could be charged on credit 
card accounts issued by a bank, savings 
association, or credit union. Except as oth-
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erwise provided, the interest rate or fi-
nance charge assessed with respect to any 
account for which charges may be added 
by the use of a bank credit card shall not 
exceed an annual rate equal to 10% plus 
the savings account interest rate paid by 
the financial institution issuing the card. 
{A. F&I] 
AB 1995 (Archie-Hudson), as intro-
duced March 5, would authorize state-
chartered banks, savings associations, and 
credit unions to restructure a loan or ex-
tend credit terms and obligations to minor-
ity or women business enterprises in ac-
cordance with safe and sound financial 
operations. Any loan so restructured or 
extended shall not be classified as delin-
quent, and the financial institution shall 
not be required to increase its reserves, or 
be subject to adverse regulatory action 
because of that loan. [A. F &/] 
AB 1756 (Tucker), as amended June 9, 
would prohibit state, city, and county gov-
ernments from contracting for services with 
financial institutions with $100 million dol-
lars or more in assets unless those companies 
file Community Reinvestment Act reports 
annually with the Treasurer. The Treasurer 
would be required to annually submit a re-
port to the legislature and to make summa-
ries available to the public. These reports 
would include specified information regard-
ing the nature of the governance of the com-
panies, and their lending and investment 
practices, with regard to race, ethnicity, gen-
der, and income of the governing boards and 
of the recipients of loans and contracts from 
the institutions. { A. Inactive File J 
■ LITIGATION 
On July 8, former savings and loan 
boss Charles Keating and his son, Charles 
Keating III, were sentenced following 
their January 1993 convictions on federal 
charges of racketeering, bank and securi-
ties fraud, conspiracy, and the interstate 
transportation of stolen goods. The elder 
Keating, who is already serving a ten-year 
state sentence for defrauding 25,000 in-
vestors out of $268 million by persuading 
them to buy worthless junk bonds instead 
of government-issued certificates, was 
found guilty of all 73 counts brought 
against him; his son was found guilty of 
all 64 counts brought against him. 
{13:2&3 CRLR 147] The elder Keating 
was sentenced to twelve years and seven 
months in federal prison for the racketeer-
ing and securities violations; his son was 
sentenced to eight years and one month. 
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